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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIS C. GABBARD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20750

v.
DAVID A. BEACH, Bureau Chief,
Driver License Services,
Defendant/Respondent,

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order issued by the Honorable
Leonard H, Russon sustaining an order of driver's license
suspension issued by respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
By Order dated July 1, 19 85, following review of the
file and hearing arguments of counsel, the court below ruled that
the Order of Suspension issued by respondent under date of March
18, 1985 was supported by substantial and competent evidence and
therefor sustained the said order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the District
Court with instructions on remand to order respondent to reinstate

appellant's driving privileges.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is an order of suspension of driver's license

which pre-dates the driver's license suspension hearing a denial
of due process on its face?
2.

Where a statute mandates that the standards of the

Commissioner of Public Safety be followed in the administration
of chemical testing for breath/blood alcohol, is it a foundational
requirement to provide evidence that said standards were followed
in order to properly admit the results of said test?
3.

Is the order of suspension arbitrary and capricious

where chemical test results are admitted absent a showing of
compliance with the commissioner's standards?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 21, 1985, appellant was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of Section
41-6-44, Utah Code Ann.

The arresting officer served appellant

with a notice of intention to suspend his driver's license
pursuant to 41-2-19.6.

That notice informed the appellant

he had ten days to request a hearing before the "department."
(Respondent),(Exhibit A ) .
Appellant timely requested a hearing which was
scheduled for March 22, 1985.

At the hearing testimony was
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taken from Deputies Beam and Dial of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office and certain documents were admitted as evidence. (A
transcript of the hearing is attached as Exhibit B ) .
Sometime in early April, 198 5, appellant received an
Order of Suspension dated March 18, 1985, signed by respondent,
notifying him that his driver's license was suspended for 90 days
(Exhibit C ) .
On April 8, 1985 appellant filed a Petition for Hearing
in the Third District Court oursuant to 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann.,
requesting the court to review the decision of respondent and
vacate the said order of suspension.
The matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
Leonard H. Russon on May 21, 19 85.

After hearing argument of

counsel and reviewing the file, the court issued a Memorandum
Decision, same date (Exhibit D ) .

Having failed to rule on

appellant1s first issue (order pre-dating the hearing), the
court issued a supplemental opinion denying appellant's claim.
On July 1, 1985 the Court signed its Findings of
Fact and Conslusions of Law and Order from which this appeal
lies (Exhibit E ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I of this brief will argue that respondent failed
to comply with the statutory requirements of 41-2-19.6 and with
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common law and constitutional requirements of due process in
issuing its suspension order prior to the hearing on the same
matter.
Point II will argue that the respondent's hearing
officer

admitted chemical breath test results without sufficient

foundation and in violation of 41-6-44.3.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING
RESPONDENT'S ORDER OF SUSPENSION WHERE
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS
PRIMA FACIE VIOLATED
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah,
The Fifth Admendment to the United States Constitution and
multitudes of cases interpreting the same leave no doubt that
persons involved in the administrative process are entitled to
the due process of law prior to any deprivation of life, liberty
or property.

"Property" and "liberty" have been extended to

include "privileges." (Cf 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the abundant case
law defining the scope of due process under that act).
Furthermore, where certain rights, obligations or
expectations are set forth in statutes, ordinances, rules,
policies and the like, persons who's conduct is regula-ced
thereby can achieve a property right status or an expectation
akin to contract in reliance thereon.
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The U.S. Supreme Court

has gone so far as to hold that where a state grants written
procedural rights to convicts which aren't even constitutionally
required, that state is bound by it's own written rules and must
afford those rights it has created.

(Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539 (1974)).
In 41-2-19.6 the State of Utah legislated that when
police officers make DUI arrests they seize the arrestees
driver's license, serve him notice of the State's intent to
suspend his license after 31 days unless he requests a hearing
to oppose the said suspension and if said hearing is requested,
he is afforded a right to said hearing.

All these things were

done in the instant case.
The salient issue deals with 41-2-19.6(5).

"After the

hearing, the department shall order (suspension or no suspension)."
(Emphasis added).

This section presumes that a fair and impartial

hearing will determine the efficacy of the arresting officer's
"interim" suspension based upon

competent and substantial evidence.

The burden of proof which the state is required to meet in driver's
license hearings concerning DUI suspensions and revocations is a
"preponderance of evidence."

Murray v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

In this case the hearing to determine whether or not to
suspend was held four days after the Order of Suspension was dated.
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The respondent will argue the need to have the order
ready "just in case" is a computerized ""bureaucratic necessity to
efficiently manage the driver's license system.

Appellant presumes

that this court would take a dim view of criminal trial judges
preparing, signing and issuing judgments and verdicts of guilt
before the trial of the accused actually occurs.
The action of the respondent shows a predisposition to
place the burden of proof on the appellant.

The order in this

case was issued prior to the statutorily mandated 31-day period
expired and must therefor be considered void ab initio by this
court.
POINT II: THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING
RESPONDENT'S ORDER OF SUSPENSION WHERE
SAID ORDER WAS BASED ON INADMISSABLE
EVIDENCE
It is the policy of the driver's license hearing officers",
except in rare circumstances, to avoid suspensions of license absent
a valid, admissable breath test.
that assertion.

Respondent will not argue with

Therefore, the breath test results in this case

are critical.
It is statutorily mandated at 41-6-44.3(1), Utah Code Ann.,
that the Commissioner of Public Safety establish standards for
breath testing by police officers.
record in the State Archives.
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Those standards are public

It is also statutorily required that before documents
purporting to prove breath test results may be admitted in
evidence, the proponent must provide the foundation that the
"analysis was made and the instrument used was accurate,
according to standards established in (41-6-44.3(1))..."

The

judge may find the results trustworthy only if "subsection (2)
is satisfied (emphasis added).
Ergo, the proponent must introduce the written standards
and provide evidence that those standards were complied with in
the analysis stage and in the interpretation stage.
In this case the appellant not only objected to the
admission of the breath testing documents because respondent
failed to offer the commissioner's standards and could not
therefore provide sufficient foundation, (Exhibit B, pages 11
and 12); appellant asked the police officer on cross-examination
if he was familiar with those standards and he replied that he
had never seen them (Exhibit B, page 9 ) .
Since the hearing officer did not have the standards
before him as an exhibit and his witness could not provide the
foundational testimony, the admission of the testing documents
was totally without foundation and the decision based thereon
was arbitrary and capricious and should not have been sustained
by the court.
-7-

The respondent will claim that the hearing officer
found that all "procedures and requirements" were met.
requirements?

Who's

Respondent cannot point to a single part of the

record that shows compliance with the "commissioner's standards".
It is not the officer's standards, the department's standards or
the policeman's standards that are material or statutorily
sufficient.
This must be reversed and remanded and the order of
suspension must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in appellant's arguments,
both on statutory as well as constitutional grounds, the court
should reverse the decision of the court below and remand this
matter with instruction to vacate the Order of Suspension
issued by respondent herein.
RESPECTUFLLY SUBMITTED this/^_J>_day of August, 1985.

LONI F. DeLAND
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Appellant
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)364-1333
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MAILED, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to Bruce Hale, Assistant Attorney General,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this >9 < T
of August, 1985.

LONI F. DeLAND
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EXHIBIT B

Transcription of Official Tape
of the Hearing
iMarch 22, 1985
H.O.: Dennis Hicks
Att.: Lonnie F. Deland
Driver: Willis C. Gabbard
DL #3842817
DOB: 7-9-39

H.O.:

This administrative suspension hearing is being conducted at the
request of Willis C. Gabbard, 10955 South 1300 West, South
Jordan, Utah. Mr. Gabbardfs date of birth is 7-9-39. Driver
License Number is 3842817 and today's date is Friday, March 22,
1985.

Present for the hearing are Dennis H. Hicks, the hearing

officer; arresting officer is Deputy Beam of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office; and, ah, we also have a witness, Wayne Dial of
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office; Attorney of record is
Lonnie F. Deland. Mr. Gabbard is not present for the hearing.
Lonnie, is he going to come in?
Att.:

No.

H.O.:

Mr. Gabbard will not be present for the hearing but he is
represented by Counsel. Again, the hearing is being conducted at
the driver's request. Formal rules of evidence and procedure
shall not strictly apply.

However, as the hearing officer I will

take sworn testimony and I'll consider all relevant evidence. If
Mr. Gabbard's privilege to drive is suspended, he does have the
right to petition a court of record in the county in which he
resides within 30 days after the effective date of such
suspension for judicial review by that court. So those
testifying will be sworn and we will begin with the hearing. So,

ah, Deputy Beam, would you please raise your right hand?

Do you

swear any testimony you may give during the course of the hearing
to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you, God?
Officer:

I do.

H.O.:

Thank you. Deputy Dial, would you please raise your right hand?
Do you swear any testimony you may give during the course of the
hearing to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?

Witness:

I do.

H.O.:

Thanks.

I have in receipt from the Salt Lake County Sheriff!s

Office several documents I'd like to identify for the record.
Documents will be taken into consideration.

First of all, we

have a copy of a DUI summons and citation indicates to me that
Willis C. Gabbard, 7-9 of 39 was arrested February 21, 1985.
Military time indicated is 2325.

Charged with driving under the

influence by Deputy Beam of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office. Attached to that we have what appears to me to be the
original DUI report form filled out in conjunction with the same
arrest.

Report form has been signed, the signature has been

notarized and there is an authorized endorsing signature. We
have also copies, photostat copies, intoxilyzer operational check
list, and test record.

Indicates the machine location is 4474

South Main, which I believe to be the traffic division in Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office. Ah, it indicates on both the test
record and the check list that the subject is Willis C. Gabbard
and the date is 2-21-85. The operator is Deputy Dial.
Att. :

What does your record show? My copy doesn't —

24 at calibration

(inaudible conversation between two individuals)
H.O.:

Okay, you're looking on the test record.

Att.:

Uh-huh.

H.O.:

Okay. Correct, two four. From our records I would like to also
add copies of the intoxilyzer test record.

Have your still got

them?
Officer:

I got copies.

•••

(Further inaudible conversation)

?

You showed it to me.

?

(Further inaudible conversation)

?

You can search roe before I leave.

?

What is it you're looking for? An original copy?

H.O.:

The intoxilyzer service affidavit. Ah, for the record I have one

(Laughter)

right here.
?

Ah ha, search him (Laughter)

H.O.:

I have one from February 13th and I have one from March 2nd, a
before and an after, done by the technician of the Sheriff's
Office, Stan Jensen. Ah, same location, same serial number,
984001121 and those will also be taken into consideration.

Att.:

(inaudible) inspect them now or later?

H.O.:

Ah, which ever.

Att.:

I'll save everything until the end.

H.O.:

All right.

(Laughter)

Deputy Beam, can you identify the DUI

report form as the original you filled out in conjunction with
the arrest of Mr. Gabbard?
Officer:

Yeah, that's my writing, my signature.

H.O.:

Okay. On the back, ah, you've indicated that that is your
signature, correct?

Officer:

Yes, it is.

H.O.:

Did you sign in front of a notary?

Officer:

Yes, I did.

H.O.:

Indicated here?

Officer:

Uh-huh.

H.O.:

Did you swear before that notary that the contents of this report
were all true and correct to the best of your knowledge?

Officer:

Yes, I did.

H.O.:

Is there any part of this report that you did not fill out
yourself other than the authorized endorsing signature and the
notary public?

Officer:

It's all filled out by me.

H.O.:

Can you describe to me what you did when you had that document
notarized?

Officer:

Ah, I contacted the field commander who is the notary, raised my
right hand.

I don't remember — • he asked me if the contents of

this report were true to the best of my knowledge.

I don't

remember exactly what he said and I said "I do" and he signed it
and notarized it.
H.O.:

Thank you. According to the report form you observed Mr. Gabbard
in actual physical control of a vehicle and after coming in
contact with Mr. Gabbard, ah, for — • you were under the
suspicion that Mr. Gabbard could be under the influence of
alcohol.

Officer:

That's correct.

H.O.:

First of all, what brought your attention to the Gabbard vehicle,
or the vehicle driven by Mr. Gabbard, I should say.

Officer:

I was in my car sitting at the, in the left turn lane, ah,

southbound to go east on 45th. Ah, I observed another car
northbound weaving in and out of traffic approaching 4500 South
and I couldn't guess at his speed but he was passing most
everything that was on the street. When he got to the red light
at 4500 South and State Street he, ah, slammed on his brakes and
he, he, ah, slid into the intersection, maybe as far as the first
lane and then just continued through the red light. As he got
through the intersection I made a "U" turn and got behind him.
He then went from the far right hand lane, which was the lane
that he was in when he went through the intersection, to the
inside or the left lane and now traveling about 20 to 25 miles an
hour.

I followed him a block. He went into the left turn lane

at about, I believe the intersection's 4295, and made a "U" turn
and now he's going south on State Street and at which time Ie
stopped him.
H.O.:

What led you to believe that he may be under ...

Officer:

Well...

H.O.:

...driving under the influence of alcohol.

Officer:

As I walked up to the vehicle he rolled the window down and, ah,
there was a very distinct odor of alcohol coming from the car. I
asked him to step out. When he stepped out of the car he had to
use the car to —

he was leaning against the car with his left

hand and there was an odor of alcohol about him and on his
breath. His eyes were watery and, ah, basically it appeared to
me at that time that he had been drinking alcohol.
H.O.:

Okay. How did you identify the driver?

Officer:

With his driver's license, Utah driver's license.

H.O.:

All right, what were the sequence of events from that point?
5

Officer:

I asked him if he had been drinking. He stated that he had had
some to drink.

I then asked him if he would take some field

sobriety tests to see if he was able to operate a motor vehicle.
H.O.:

And did you give some, or administer field sobriety tests?

Officer:

Yesf I did.

H.O.:

And, ah, what conclusion did you draw?

Officer:

If I might look at ray — .

(Coughing)

Okay, on a couple of the tests he did

fair, ah, on a couple. The two balance tests I asked him to just
stand heel to toe while I explained what I wanted him to do and
he had to step to the side several times. I asked him to stand
on one foot and count to 30 out loud for me and he had to step
off several times to maintain his balance, and it was my opinion
at that time that he was under the influence of alcohol to the
point where he couldn't operate a motor vehicle.
H.O.:

Okay. How many tests did you give altogether?

Officer:

Four.

H.O.:

So you're saying that two were okay and two weren't.

Officer:

Basically his, ah, when I just asked him to stand with his feet
together and his head back he swayed slightly and I would say he
did fair compared to some I've seen. When I asked him to walk
heel to toe he, ah, the steps weren't all heel to toe. He did
take the correct number of steps. When he turned to take the
steps back he stumbled and, ah, when he did the, ah, —

like I

explained before the heel to toe just standing there he was
unable to just stand heel to toe without stepping to the side to
maintain his balance.
H.O.:

You mean you're conclusions were then...

Officer:

That he was under the influence of alcohol which impaired his

wmm

ability to drive a car.
H.O.:

And what did you do about that?

Officer:

At that time I placed him under arrest for driving under the
influence of alcohol.

H.O.:

Okay. Go over the sequence of events from that point.

Officer:

Ah, Deputy Dial had arrived on the scene and I asked him if he
would conduct the intoxilyzer test. I'm not currently certified
and he was driven over to Traffic Division where Deputy Dial
administered the test.

H.O.:

Did you transport?

Officer:

Yes, I did.

H.O.:

Were you present during the testing procedure?

Officer:

Yes, I was.

H.O.:

What did you observe?

Officer:

Well, we —

I had read him the, ah, request to take the breath

test and the, ah, the, ah, statements about .08% would, ah, was
above the legal limit and he could lose his driver's license,
suspended or revocation of his driver's license and Deputy Dial
conducted the intoxilyzer test.
H.O.:

Okay.

Did Mr. Gabbard agree to the test?

Officer:

Yes, he did.

H.O.:

(Coughing) Do you have any questions, Lonnie?

Att.:

Well, I'm just going to ask —

you indicated you watched Deputy

Dial perform that intoxilyzer test. That is, what did you
observe him do?
Officer:

Ah, well, not knowing that much about it, he went through the
check list, ah, like I said I don't know that much about the
intoxilyzer machine to tell you, you know, if it was done

correctly or not, but, ah, he went through the check list. He
read the, the, ah, whatever you want to call it, you know, what
would occur, you know, with the chemical test as far as the
driver's license suspension went. And, ah, did the test.
Att.:

You watched, you watched Mr. Gabbard blow into the machine.

Officer:

Yes, I did.

Att.:

You saw the results come out?

Officer:

Yeah.

Att.:

All right. Had you at any time prior to today, ah, seen Deputy
Dial's certification?

Officer:

No.

Att.:

You presumed that he was certified at that time...

Officer:

To my best knowledge that he was certified.

Att.:

That's all.

H.O.:

Let me just get some clarification. Ah, you indicated that you
weren't currently certified.

Have you ever been certified?

Officer:

Yes, I have.

H.O.:

Okay, on an intoxilyzer?

Officer:

On the intoxilyzer and the breathalyzer.

H.O.:

Did it lapse or..?

Officer:

I was in vice for two and a half years and we never got to
re-certify on it. So my certification lapsed.

H.O.:

Okay.

Att.:

Let me just ask a follow-up question on that. In that case the,
ah, machine that you used out at the sub station is the CMI 4011
ASA. Well, you wouldn't know that.

Officer:

(Laugh) It's a big box that says intoxilyzer on (Laughter).

Att.:

According to your report, referring to the operational check
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listf I think that exhibit speaks for itself. That's an ASA
check list.

It's that right there that you got. When you were

certified the only machines out at that time would have been, if
it was two and a half years ago, would have been the 4011 and the
4011A, is that true?
Officer;

I think —

it was —

-

—

-^

I was certified on that just as they were

starting to put the intoxilyzer to use.
Att.:

All right. Have you seen the Commissioner of Public Safety's
regulation that was published on this or the operating procedures
published by CMI on the ASA?

Officer 2

I've never seen them.

Att.:

That's all.

H.O.:

Okay.

(Cough) Deputy Dial, you've heard the testimony here of

Deputy Beam, and he's already testified to the fact that, ah, ah,
you were called or you appeared at the scene, ah, so let's start
at that point. Ah, of the arrest, I should say. The scene of
the arrest when I said the scene. Ah, let's begin at that point
and can you tell me what you witnessed once you arrived.
Witness:

I arrived at the Currant's address, ah, and the, ah, Mr. Gabbard
was being placed under arrest at the time. Ah, after he was
being, after he had been placed under arrest, I checked his mouth
following the Baker Ruling to insure that time would lapse from
the time his mouth was checked and the time he blew into the
machine. Ah, there was another individual in the vehicle which
he had been stopped and a passenger — - normally we impound a
vehicle. Well, in this case we were going to determine whether
this individual could drive the vehicle away from the scene. So
I conducted a couple of field sobriety tests on his passenger and

it was determined by me that he was not impaired and that he
could take the vehicle at that time.

I responded to our traffic

division, turned on the breathalyzer, and started my paper work.
Deputy Beam arrived a few moments later.

I am sure that the

Baker Rule was followed to determine that the time had elapsed
that is required.

I am currently certified and was certified at

that time. This is my certification card.
Good until November.
Correct. After conducting the, ah, intoxilyzer I took the check
list, the test record, and the license of the arrestee and made
three copies. One for Deputy Beam and two for the County
Attorney and this used as well.

Ah, I made those copies.

Okay, ah, as you operated that particular machine, did you follow
the nine steps?
I did.
And as you, ah, completed each of those steps —

what do you do

just check it off for...?
Correct. As each step is completed I check it off and move on to
the next step. At the time the machine was turned on was 2335.
The time he blew into the machine was 2350.

The time I checked

his mouth would probably ten minutes prior to 2335, approximately
10 minutes. I would estimate.
Did you have any problems with the machine?
No.
What result?
The results of the breath test were .14.
Okay. Ah, I can't see any place on here other than the actual
stamp, ah, what's the actual calibration of that machine, do you

10

know?
Officer:

No.

H.O.:

Question?

Att.:

I'll give you my good objection first.

I'm ready.
(Laughter) shopping list.

(Laughter) All right?
H.O.:

AJJ_r^t^______

Att.:

No foundation for the breath results. You don't have a third
digit. You don't know the calibration. Law requires you to be
within .01./Ah, here's the shopping list now.

H.O.:

Okay.

Att.:

Object to the admission of the affidavit (inaudible) request
prior to this hearing nor are they certified or —

certified

copies pursuant to the rules of evidence or originals. Nor is
there a supervisory affidavit per Murray vs Hall. Ahf even
though Deputy Dial's here I will still object to the —

since

it's based upon the report. Since that is an item signed and
subscribed to by Deputy Dial on the report not on the two
exhibits, check list and the result.

I'll object to their

admission on those grounds as well. Ah, and further —

^\"~^|

based

upon tendings and unfamiliarity with the machine (inaudible)
sufficient level to (inaudible). Ahf 41-6-44.3 which mandates
the Commissioner's regulations or the manufacturer's regulations
to follow. Copy here, if you take notice of the ASA regulations
(inaudible) a deputy with a check list does not use the same

II

steps that the latest publication by Oil.

/1

(Inaudible)

If you

check with the Highway Patrol they'll tell you that they made1
those check lists differently.
H.O.

/

Couple of steps.

What you're saying then is that the Sheriff's office made this up

U

and UHP made up a different plan.
Att.:

UHP is the samef I think.

If everybody used the same one —

for

some reason they made a policy decision not to precisely follow
those outlined by O H and I —

and their experts will testify it

doesn't make any difference. You get the same results.
H.O.:

Okay, now...(inaudible)

Att.:

(inaudible) It's a technical argument.

H.O.:

Okay, now I understand what you are saying.

Att.:

I'm saying the statute has to be followed.

H.O.:

Okay.

Att.:

Strictly.

H.O.:

Okay. All right.

I understand what you're saying now. Ah,

anything else?
Att.:

That's it.

H.O.:

All right. Of course I'll take everything into consideration
before I make a decision, and, ah, it will probably be best to
also notify your office because we don't for sure exactly what
Mr. Gabbard's address is.

Att.:

Oh, I looked on my —

I'm sure that one address is his home and

the other one is his..
H.O.:

Business?

Att.:

Business.

H.O.:

I think he used his business address when the old lady threw him
out.

Att.:

Yeah, that's what he said.

He says I'm living here now.

(Laughter)
H.O.:

Well, with her friends now maybe he's back to 109 (inaudible)

Att.:

Yeah, he called me yesterday to see what the results of this
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hearing were and I said, "I wouldn't be able to tell you that for
another 24 hours." And he said, "Oh" and he was holding this in
his hand and he said I just misread it. So I know he got it.
But I think you can feel safe in sending it to the South Jordan
address and if he doesn't get it I'll bear the responsibility of
sending a copy anyway.
H.O.:

Sounds good.
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TRANSCRIPTION CERTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Departmental Hearing of the matter of
State of Utah versus Willis C. Gabbard, File Number 3842817 was
electronically recorded by the Office of Driver License Services.
That such recording was transcribed by me into typewriting; and
that a true and correct transcription of said recording, to the best of
my knowledge, is set forth in the foregoing pages.

WITNESS MY HAND this 8th day of May 1985.

W t - y 7

_
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION

OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
SCOTT M. MATHESON
Governor
LARRY E. IUNNEN
Comm»Mion»r

WILLIS C GABBARD
10955 SO 1300 WEST
SO. JORDAN, UT. 84065

DRIVER IMPROVEMENT SECTION
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
965-4437
1 8 MARCH

ROBERT f. PARENT!
Director

1985

FRED C SCHWENDIMAN, M91
Driver license Services

ORDER OF SUSPENSION
LICENSE NUMBER 003842817

BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 24 MARCH 1985.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT YOU IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS
DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NUMBER 003842817 AND
ALL OTHER DRIVER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU.
THE AUTHORITY FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-19.6 AND THAT
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW).
UTAH LAW REQUIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIY1NG PRIVILEGE
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $25.00 FEE FOLLOWING
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $25.00
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED FOR
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE.
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED UPON DEMAND ALL
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT.
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON THE
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED.
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE
COUNTY CF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.
DATED AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THIS 18TH DAY OF MARCH 1985,
85 cc: Loni F. DeLand
Attorney at Law
132 S. 600 E.
S.L.C. UT 84102

VERY TRULY YOURS,

DAVID A. BEACH, BUREAU CHIEF
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
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EXHIBIT D
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.
vs.

C-85-2219

:

DAVID A. BEACH, Bureau
Chief, Driver License
Services,
Respondent.

:
:
:

Petitioner, Willis C. Gabbard, appeals from the respondent's
decision suspending his driving privileges for 90 days.
matter came on for hearing this date.

The Court received

This
the

transcript of the hearing, along with pertinent documents, including
the report of the hearing of the administrative officer, two
affidavits of breath test technicians, the DUI Summons and Citation,
DUI Report Form of the arresting officer, Intoxilyzer Test Record
and Checklist, and miscellaneous correspondence, including the
Order of Suspension, dated March 18, 1985, effective March 24,
1985, and mailed to the petitioner on April 4, 1985.
Petitioner claims that the actions of respondent were arbitrary
and capricious in that there was insufficient evidence to support
the findings of the examiner, and that the Order of Suspension
was prepared and dated March 18, 1985 (four days prior to the
hearing date.)
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Section 41-2-19.6 of Utah Code Ann. provides that a peace
officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a driver is in
violation of Section 41-6-44 has a right to request a chemical
test be performed

for blood/alcohol.

If the blood/alcohol is

found to be .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination,
based upon reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise
in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer may take the driver's
license and issue a temporary license good for 30 days.
Section 41-6-44.5 provides that chemical tests taken within
two hours of the alleged driving shall be presumed to be "not
less" than the level of alcohol determined

to be in the blood

by the chemical test itself.
Section 41-6-44.3 provides that the commissioner of public
safety shall establish standards for the administration and
interpretation of chemical analysis and standards for training.
Documents proving that the analysis was made and the instrument
was accurate in accordance with the commissioner's standards
are admissible into evidence if the judge finds that such documents
indicating the same were made in the regular course of investigation,
at or about the time of the act, condition or event, and the
source of the information from which the document was made indicate
trustworthiness.
In the case at bar affidavits of Stan Jensen indicate that
the equipment in question was tested in accordance with standards
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established by the commissioner of public safety and passed
such test indicating the instrument was working properly.

One

such test occurred prior to the arrest in question, and the
other test subsequent thereto.
The Intoxilyzer Test Record indicates that nine items were
checked on the Operational Checklist.
the intoxilyzer machine was operated

This would indicate that
in accordance with the

nine requirements set forth on the Operational Checklist. However,
there was no evidence as to whether or not this checklist complies
with standards set forth by the commissioner of public safety.
Also, there is no testimony as to the meaning of the calibrating
reading of .24%.

There is testimony, however, by the operator

of the machine to the effect that it was working properly without
problem at the time of testing.
The investigating

officer, T. J. Beam testified

hearing of his observations of petitioner.

at the

He testified

that

he observed the petitioner "weaving in and out of traffic" approaching

4500 South, and "passing most everything

on the street."

He testified

that was

the petitioner slammed on his

brakes and slid into the intersection through a red light, and
then continued through the red light, and continued for a block
wherein he made a U-turn.
stopped him.

It was at this point the officer
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He detected a

MEMORANDUM DECISION

"very distinct odor of alcohol coming

from

the car" and from the petitioner as he stepped out of his car.
The petitioner's eyes were watery.
that petitioner

It appeared to the officer

"had been drinking alcohol."

observations, including

Based upon his

the results of field sobriety tests,

he concluded that petitioner was under the influence of alcohol
which impaired his ability to drive a car.
Deputy Dial testified

that in performing the intoxilyzer

test, he followed the prescribed nine steps and had no problems
with the machine.

The test results indicated .14% blood/alcohol.

The arresting officer's DUI Report Form included information
that the petitioner was driving "at a high rate of speed approaching
the red light" when he put on his brakes and skidded
the intersection.

through

The driver stated he had consumed three rum

and cokes, and three beers, the first drink being consumed at
8:30 or 9:00 o'clock, and the last drink five minutes before
being stopped by the police.

This Report was signed

22, 1985 at 02:30 a.m., and was notarized.

February

It was also endorsed

by the signature of the chief of police or the equivalent, Dee
A. Kartchner.
The question on appeal is whether or not there was a residuum
of evidence before the hearing examiner upon which he could
reasonably base his decision.

In this regard, there was sufficient

testimony that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds
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to believe that the petitioner was in violation of Section 41-6-44,
even without the blood/alcohol test.

However, the Court believes

there was enough evidence to indicate the machine was working
in accordance with standards of the commissioner, and enough
evidence to imply that the test was administered in accordance
with standards of the commissioner.
The actions of the hearing examiner in suspending the petitioner's driver's license are affirmed.
Counsel for defendant will prepare the Order in accordance
with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

£-(

day of May, 1985.

kl

LeorxartL &. £uss&r\

LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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EXHIBIT E
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472)
Attorney General
BRUCE M. HALE (#1298)
Assistant Attorney General
Room 236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-7606
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIS C. GABBARD,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief,
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,

Case No. C-85-2219
Judge Leonard H. Russon

Respondent.

This matter having come before the Court on May 21,
1985, and the parties being represented by their respective
counsel and the Court having received and reviewed the record of
the Department of Public Safety, State of Utah and administrative hearing in the above-entitled matter, and plaintiff's
complaint alleging that the Office of Driver License Services was
arbitrary and capricious under the Utah Operator's License Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20, the Court being fully
apprised in the premises now makes its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the evidence and the agency

record preponderates that there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the findings of the hearing officer of the
Department of Public Safety.

There was sufficient testimony that

the arresting officer had cause to stop and probable cause to
arrest/ did arrest and had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioner was in violation of Section 41-6-44, even without the
blood alcohol test to establish a residuum of evidence, upon
which the hearing officer could reasonably base his decision.
The Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence is that
the intoxlizer machine was working in accordance with the
standards of the Commissioner of Public Safety, and the chemical
breath test was administered in accordance with the standards of
the Commissioner.
2.

The Court further finds that all of the elements of

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 were proven before the Agency.

The

Court specifically finds that the evidence before the Agency is
competent and preponderates that the arresting officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff may have been in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, when he observed him 1)
weaving in and out of traffic, 2) driving at a high rate of speed
as he approached a stop light, then applying his brakes and
skidding through the intersection, 3) and detected a distinct
odor of alcohol emanating from the car as well as the
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petitioner's person.

The petitioner was then arrested, and was

requested to take an intoxilyzer test, and advised that a result
indicating a blood alcohol content, by weight, of .08% or more
shall and can result in the suspension or revocation of the
person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, that a
chemical test was voluntarily agreed to by plaintiff, and that it
was properly given by a certified operator showing reliably a
result of .08% or above of alcohol by weight in plaintiff's
blood.
3.

The Court further finds that the DUI report was

properly signed, notarized, countersigned and forwarded to the
Office of Driver License Services within five days of the arrest,
that plaintiff requested a timely hearing which was held by an
unbiased Hearing Officer with the plaintiff, as well as the
officer, offering sworn testimony.
4.

The hearing was granted prior to 30 days from the

date of the arrest, and the statute grants the plaintiff due
process and the opportunity to appeal to this Court for a hearing
on the record and a determination of whether or not the
Department was arbitrary or capricious.
5*

The arresting officer gave sworn testimony before

the Department to the contents of the DUI Report Form.

The Court

finds that the officer who administered the brbath test with the
intoxilyzer was certified, that he used a checklist and had no
problems with the machine.

The intoxilyzer was therefore
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properly presumed to be reliable and in working order and the
results were admissible before the Administrative Department
without further foundation as official records of the Department
of Public Safety.
6.
suspended.

Pursuant to § 41-2-19.6 the plaintiff's license was

The plaintiff appealed that adverse decision to this

Court for a review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-19.6 and
41-2-20.
7.

The Court adopts the memorandum decision issued by

the Court on the 21st day of May, and it's supplement of May 29,
1985, in the above-entitled matter.
Having made the foregoing findings of fact, the Court
now makes its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that there was substantial

competent evidence to support the Department's determination to
sustain the Notice of Intention to Suspend plaintiff's privilege
to operate a vehicle in the State of Utah served upon plaintiff
when he was arrested and due process was granted.
2.

There was competent evidence to support the

Administrative findings, and the Court concludes that the
arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe th#t the
plaintiff may have been in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44,
and that there were reliable test results which indicated a
blood alcohol content of .08% or greater in the plaintiff, or
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that the plaintiff had been operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol rendering him incapable of safely driving
the same.
3.

The Court concludes that the intoxilyzer machine

was reliable and the results admissible before the Department,
pursuant to the presumption set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-644.5 and 44.3, and Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah
1983) .
4.

The Court further concludes that, under the defini-

tions of arbitrary and capricious given in Utah Department of
Administrative Services v« Public Service Commission/ 658 p.2d
601, the Department of Public Safety's decision was not arbitrary
or capricious.
The Court having made the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law, now makes the following:
ORDER
1.

The decision of the Department of Public Safety,

Office of Driver License Services, is sustained and plaintiff's
driving privileges are to be suspended or revoked as required by
law.

,
DATED this

/

day of c )U/U

, 1985.

'sonnr* JT//^5d)?]
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
first class postage prepaid, to the following on this
of June, 1985:
Loni F. DeLand
Attorney at Law
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

-6-

day

41-2-19.6

MOTOR VEHICLES

sections 41-2-29 and 41-2-30, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter
83, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-43.10,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended
by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, section
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last
amended by chapter 46 Laws of Utah 1982,
sections 41-6-44.3 and 41-6-44.5, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 243,
Laws of Utah 1979, section 41-6-44.10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter
126, Laws of Utah 1981, section 41-22-14,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1971, section
63-43-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last

amended by chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1980,
section 73-18-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
af3 last amended by chapter 183, Laws of
Lftah 1977, and section 76-5-207, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter
g^ L a w s 0 f u t a n 1981, enacts sections
4l_2-19.5 and 41-2-19 6, Utah Code Annotated
1 9 „ . r e D G a l s a n d r e e n a c t s s e c t l o n 41-6-43
Jf 3 ' 'epfalsA a n ° "*"*£,, s e C t l 0 n , ,b t
H tah C o d e Annotated 1953, as enacted by
4aPter 242> L a w s o f U t a h 1979^ a n d r e P e a l s
section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
a? last amended by chapter 4, Laws of Utah
1982, Second Special Session - Laws 1983,
cji. 99.

41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request —
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Suspension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
may be violating or has violated section 41-6^44 the peace officer may, in connection
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to
be administered in compliance with the standards set forth in section 41-6-44.10.
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based on
reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit,
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply
to the driver, on a form to be approved tyy the department, basic information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve also as the
temporary license.
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicating the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. fiach such report shall be on a form
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equivalent or by a person authorized by him, other tjhan the officer serving the notice.
(5) Upon written request of a person wh0 has been issued a 30-day license, the
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-day license.
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in which the arrest
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing may be held
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
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to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any. In connection
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the department shall be as valid as if made after a hearing before the full
membership of the department. After the hearing, the department shall order,
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this subsection, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date
of the arrest. A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest. The
department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision
that the suspension was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by
the provisions of section 41-2-20.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 6.
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, revocation or suspension
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the department except where such cancellation or
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right to file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the county
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days' written notice
to the department; and thereupon to take testimony #nd examine 4»to -the facts
Or tile CaSC and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or ta
subject to cancellation, suspension or revocation of license under -the provisions -of
fckio aet. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to determine
whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 20; 1935, ch. 47,
§ 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7.

41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person whose license has been
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or receive any new license
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as
provided in section 41-2-8, and a license so issued shall be subject to all of the
provisions of an original license. The department shall not grant the license until
an investigation of the character, abilities and habits of the driver has been made
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the
highways.
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's or chauffeur's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this
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act shall not operate a motor vehicle in this state under a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction or otherwise during such suspension or after such revocation until a new ljcense is obtained when and as permitted
under this act.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 21; 1935, ch. 47,
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 57-4-24; L. 1967,
ch. 82, § 12; 1983, ch. 183, § 23.
41-2-22.

Owner liable for negligence of minor.

Actions by automobile owner against third
party,
The negligence of the minor is not imputed
to the automobile owner and this section
does not provide a third party a statutory

shield against actions brought by the automobile owner against third parties for damage to the owner's automobile; comparative
negligence statutes do not change such rule.
Otto v. Leany (1981) 635 P 2d 410.

41-2-23. Violation of license provisions. It shall be unlawful for any person
to commit any of the following acts:
F i r s t (1) To display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession
any operator's or chauffeur's license knowing the same to be fictitious or to have
been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered;
Second. (2) To lend to, or knowingly permit the use of, by one not entitled
thereto, any operator's or chauffeur's license issued to the person so lending or permitting the use thereof;
Third. (3) To display or to represent as one's own any operator's or chauffeur'9
license not issued to the person so displaying the same;
Fourth. (4) To fail or refuse to surrender to the department upon demand, any
operator's or chauffeur's license which has been suspended, canceled or revoked as
provided by law;
Fifth. (5) To use a false or fictitious name or give a false or fictitious address
in any application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, or any renewal or duplicate thereof, or knowingly to make a false statement or knowingly to conceal a
material fact or otherwise commit a fraud in any such application.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §24; C. 1943,
57-4-27; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 24.
41-2-23.5. Confiscation of licenses, plates, and registration cards — Contracts with law enforcement agencies for pick-up orders — Additional fee to
cover costs. (1) The department is hereby authorized to enter into contractual
agreements with constables or other law enforcement agencies for the purpose of
facilitating confiscation of operator's and chauffeur's licenses, license or registration plates, and registration cards when a person fails or refuses to surrender any
of those documents to the department upon demand.
(2) The department shall assess against a person making an application
referred to in subsection 41-2-8(7), in addition to any fee imposed under subsection
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving privilege
is reinstated, to cover the costs required to serve orders related to the purposes
of subsection (1).
History: C. 1953, 41-2-23.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 191, § 1.

into contractual agreements with law
enforcement agencies for the purpose of
facilitating confiscation of license-privilege
Jndicia; and providing an effective date.

1 ltle of Act.
An act relating to motor vehicles; authorizing the department of public safety to enter
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W (8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when sad* the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in
which streh the person is involved and when s«ek the violation has, in fact, been
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by st*ek the person.
(t) (9) The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90
days the operator's or chauffeur^ license of any person convicted~7or the first "time
under subsection (1) of this section^ and shall revoke for one year the* license of
any person otherwise convicted underIHTs section, except that the department may
subtract from any suspensiorTperiod the number of daysTor which a license was
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based upoZ
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §34, C 1943,
57-7-111, L. 1949, ch 65, § 1, 1957, ch. 75, § 1,
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch 107, § 2; 1977, ch.
268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1, 1981, ch 63, § 2,
1982, ch. 46, § 1, 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch.
103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1983, ch 183, discontinuing separate
classification for chauffeur's license, is effective January 1, 1984
The 1982 amendment increased the minimum term in subsec (d) from 30 to 60 days,
deleted "not less than $100 nor more than"
before "$299" in subsec (d), inserted subsec
(e), redesignated former subsec (e) as (f),
increased the period of work from not less
than two nor more than 10 days to not less
41-6-44.2.

than 10 nor more than 30 days in the first
sentence of subsec. (f), added "or to obtain
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility" to the first sentence of subsec (f),
increased the periods in the second sentence
of subsec. (f) from not less than 10 nor more
than 30 days to not less than 30 nor more
than 90 days, added "plus obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation faciht>" to the
second sentence of subsec (f), inserted
subsec. (g), redesignated former subsecs (f)
and (g) as (h) and (i)
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch 46 provided
that the act should take effect upon approval
Approved February 19, 1982

Repealed.

Repeal.
Section 41-6-44 2 (L 1973, ch 80, § 2; 1982
(2nd S S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to driving with

blood alcohol content of 10% or higher, was
repealed by Laws 1983, ch 99, § 21.

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of
training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person
was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% of greater statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events
to prove that the analysis was made and accuracy of the instrument were made
pursuant to used was accurate, according to standards established in subsection
(1) shall be admissible if:
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subsection (1) and
the provisions conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there sk&& be is a presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction
of the evidence is unnecessary.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14.
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